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On	 the	one	hand,	 then,	 it	 is	unclear	 that	 (B),	 (4),	and	 (5)	always	
hold.	But,	on	the	other,	it	is	bizarre	to	think	that	there	are	no	choices	of	
Φ	which	yield	nontrivially	true	instances	of	(B),	(4),	and	(5).	Perhaps	
because	 it	 is	 far	 from	obvious	when	(B),	(4),	and	(5)	apply,	work	on	














































to	work	 in	 their	 examinations	 or	 presentations	 of	modal	 reasoning,	








10.	 Peacocke	writes,	 similarly,	 that	 “[i]n	 special	 cases,	 such	 as	 those	 in	which	
we	are	considering	only	a	restricted	vocabulary,	like	that	of	arithmetic,	it	is	
relatively	uncontroversial	 that	we	have	 arbitrary	necessitations”	 (Peacocke	
(1999),	p.	196).	See	also	Salmon	(1986),	p.	109	(quoted	at	the	start	of	the	fol-
lowing	section).
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select	 some	…	matter	m	 such	 that,	although	Woody	could	not	have	
originated	from	m, m	is	close	enough	to	being	a	possibility	for	Woody	
that	if	Woody	had originated	from	certain	matter	m’	that	is in fact	possi-
ble	for	Woody	—	matter	differing	in	as	many	molecules	from	the	actual	
original	matter	m*	as	possible,	and	sharing	as	many	molecules	with	m 


























































For,	 as	 just	 noted,	 it	 is	 a	 priori	—	and	 therefore	 true	—	that	 any	 in-
stance	of	 (α)	holds	necessarily,	and	hence	also	a	priori	 that	each	 in-
stance	of	 (α)	 is	simply	 true.	But	we	can	 therefore	plug	any	 instance	
of	 (α)	 into	one	of	 (a)	or	 (b)	 to	 get	 that	 the	 relevant	 instance	of	 (α)	
	is	necessarily	necessary.	
Now	suppose	that	P	generates	a	false	instance	of	(4);	suppose,	that	





















17.	 The	 instance	of	 (α)	envisaged	 in	 the	 text	 creates	difficulties	 for	a	 range	of	
further	 restrictions	 of	 (4)	 that	might	 be	 proposed.	 For	 example,	 someone	
might	 suggest	 that	 any	 necessary	 statement	 which	 can	 be	 deduced	 using	




If	 either	 (a)	 or	 (b)	 always	 hold	—	and	 (a)’s	 always	 obtaining	 is	 suffi-



























	 dominic	gregory Iterated Modalities, Meaning and A Priori Knowledge
philosophers’	imprint	 –		5		–	 vol.	11,	no.	3	(february	2011)
Let’s	 say	 that	 a	 context is	 being	 taken	 as	 the	 context of a	 certain	
(disambiguated	and	declarative)	sentence’s	occurrence	 if	 it	 is	 the	con-
text	which	is	being	used	to	fix	the	semantic	values	of	the	sentence’s 
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Principle	 (e)	 thus	 looks	 like	 a	 nice	 starting-point	 for	 attempts	 to	





of	 occurrence.	 But	 assume	 that	S	 is	 constant,	 stating	 that	P	 relative	
to	 each	 possible	 context	when	 that	 context	 is	 taken	 as	 the	 context	
of	occurrence.	Then	P	must	be	necessary,	being	 true	 relative	 to	any	









Principle	 (f)	was	 once	 supported	 by	 Stalnaker,21	 and	 it	 has	 recently	
been	endorsed	by	Chalmers,	who	states	that	“[i]t	is	clear	that	when	S 
is	a	priori,	it	will	have	a	necessary	primary	intension”.22


















2	+	2	=	4’.	That	 sentence	 is	 a	priori	but	 it	 is	not	 constant,	because	of	




(b)	—	which	 focused	 upon	 the	 propositions	 expressed	 by	 sentences	
containing	‘actually’	—	do	not	affect	principle	(e).
Principle	(e)	looks	set	to	justify	very	many	applications	of	(B),	(4),	
and	 (5).	 For	 instance,	 ‘it	 is	 necessary	 that	 there	 are	 infinitely	many	
primes’	 and	 ‘it	 is	possible	 that	 there	are	 infinitely	many	primes’	 are	
constant	sentences;	and	they	 look	 to	be	a	priori.	So	(e)	 licenses	 the	












of	T	which	results	 from	interpreting	each	of	 the	atomic	sentences	which	 it	
contains	using	a	constant	sentence	—	each	constant	instance	of	T’s	axioms	—	is	
constant	and	a	priori.	It	then	follows	that	what	is	stated	by	any	constant	in-










The	 previous	 putative	 counterexample	 to	 (f)	may	 be	 challenged,	
of	course.	One	might	reasonably	question	the	reliabilist	 inclinations	




Before	 concluding,	 I	 wish	 briefly	 to	 examine	 an	 elegant	 argu-
ment,	 owed	 to	 Ross	 Cameron,	 that	 bears	 upon	 various	 aspects	 of	
the	previous	discussion.26
It	is	widely	thought	that	our	knowledge	of	a	posteriori	necessities	
is	 always	 backed	 up	 by	 corresponding	 a	 priori	 conditionals.	 Kripke	
writes,	for	example,	that	“if	P is	the	[supposedly	necessary	a	posteriori]	








Suppose	 that	we	 are	 given	 some	 sentence	S expressing	 the	 nec-
essary	a	posteriori	truth	P,	where	the	necessity	of	P receives	a	priori	



















Unadorned	as	 it	 is,	 that	objection	 is	weak.	Principle	(f)	 is	appeal-
ing	 because	 it	 harmonises	with	 an	 intuitive	 picture	 of	 how	 a	 priori	
knowers	relate	to	their	environments:	they	are,	for	epistemologically	
relevant	purposes,	disconnected	from	their	surroundings,	and	hence	




have	 any	more	 bearing	 on	whether	 it	 is	 subject	 to	 (f)	 than,	 say,	 its	
status	as	disjunctive?








belief	 that	 the	 person	 forms	 using	 the	method	 is	 guaranteed	 to	 be	
correct;	and	so,	one	might	 think,	 those	beliefs	 count	as	known.	But	
some	of	the	sentences	that	our	individual	would	use	to	formulate	her	
conclusions	express	false	propositions	relative	to	some	contexts	of	oc-
23.	Where,	 following	Evans	 (1982),	p.	 31,	 ‘Julius’	 is	 a	name	whose	 reference	 is	
fixed	using	the	description	‘the	inventor	of	the	zip’.
24.	Williamson	(1986),	p.	114.	









While	 those	points	 are	fine	as	 far	 as	 they	go,	 they	do	not	go	 far	
enough.	For,	while	the	necessity	of	‘Woody	did	not	originate	from	m 
may	not	 receive	 a	 priori	 support	 from	 a	 suitable	 conditional	which	
has	 that	 very	 statement	 as	 its	 antecedent,	 it	 surely	 does	 receive	 a	
priori	 support	 from	 another	 conditional	 whose	 antecedent	 is	 not	
	knowable	a	priori.















nated	 from	m*]	 to	 the	conclusion	that	[it	 is	necessary	 that	necessar-
ily,	Woody	did	not	originate	from	m].	Yet	anyone	who	finds	Salmon’s	











How	 to	 respond?	One	 relevant	 initial	 point	 is	 that	 some	at	 least	
of	 Chandler’s	 and	 Salmon’s	 putative	 counterexamples	 to	 the	 claim	
that	necessities	are	always	necessarily	necessary	will	also	provide,	to	
those	 who	 find	 them	 at	 all	 convincing,	 apparent	 counterexamples	
to	the	idea	that	a	posteriori	necessities	always	have	a	priori	support	
in	 the	 sense	 just	 explained.	 So,	 to	 return	 to	 the	 example	 rehearsed	








28.	One	way	of	blocking	 this	 inference	 to	necessity	would	be	 to	appeal	 to	 the	
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The	overarching	aim	of	 this	paper	has	been	 to	 illustrate	 another,	
less	despairing	way	of	approaching	the	problems	which	iterated	mo-
dalities	present.	Although	the	previous	discussion	manifestly	has	not	
established	whether	 (B),	 (4),	 and	 (5)	 can	ever	 safely	be	used,	 it	has	
shown	how	to	derive	a	positive	answer	 to	 that	question	 from	an	af-






does	not	 provide	 the	materials	 for	 providing	 a	 deep	 explanation	of	
why	 (4),	 say,	 should	 be	 applicable	 to	 certain	 types	 of	 propositions.	
The	more	common	strategy	of	constructing	a	theory	of	modality	and	
checking	 its	 consequences	 for	 iterated	 modalities	 may,	 by	 contrast,	
hold	out	the	promise	of	explaining	why	modal	operators	can	or	can-
not	be	 iterated	 in	 certain	 contexts.	But	we	need	 to	do	 things	 in	 the	
right	order	—	before	we	construct	putative	explanations	of	facts	about	






















But	why	 think,	 in	 this	 case,	 that	 the	 a	 priori	 status	 of	 our	 condi-
tional	—	‘if	m*	is	largely	distinct	from	m	and	Woody	actually	originat-


















posedly	 possibly	 nonnecessary	 propositions	 is	 based.	 For	 if	Chandler	 and	
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